TM5-803-14
(3) Maintaining adequate standoff distances
architectural character of the installation. Utility
between potential locations for bombs and facil-
corridors should be used to minimize environmen-
ities.
tal disturbance and simplify maintenance. Corri-
(4) Maintaining appropriate clear zones.
dors should be located as far as possible along a
(5) Maximizing exposure on the site perimeter
site's perimeter. Utility alignments should not
to allow discovery of unauthorized approaches.
cross a site diagonally or indiscriminately since
(6) Minimizing exposure of personnel around
this may necessitate future realignment of exist-
the facility.
ing systems and increase the costs of future devel-
(7) Blocking sightlines from vantage points.
opment. To simplify maintenance, utility lines
(8) Siting and orienting buildings to minimize
should not be placed under paved areas. They may
adverse exposure.
be located at the back of the roadway curb. It is
(9) Providing barriers to unauthorized pedes-
extremely important to determine the potential for
trian and vehicle movement.
future expansion and to allow for upgrading the
(10) Providing barriers to mitigate weapons
system when locating systems. The civil, sanitary,
electrical, mechanical engineering and other mem-
(11) Providing exterior electronic security sys-
bers of the design team responsible for utilities
tems.
should be consulted on questions of location and
b. Vehicular Access. Where an identified threat
placement.
indicates that vehicle control is necessary, access
may be limited to a single or as few as possible
4 - 9 . lighting.
entry control points. Vehicle control at entry con-
trol points may require a gate and/or gatehouse,
Outdoor lighting allows such activities as driving
vehicle barriers, or a combination of the two. Ade-
and walking to continue at night under safe
quate room must be provided at the entry control
conditions. On most sites, only enough light to
point to permit search of vehicles without interfer-
cover these functions is necessary. Where physi-
ing with normal traffic flow. Both horizontal and
cal security is a concern, more lighting may be
vertical alignment of drives can be used to reduce
required. The electrical engineer on the design
speed at the entry control point. This allows more
team should address lighting issues. Lighting
reaction time to breaches of security and may
should:
reduce the size of vehicle barriers required to stop
a. Provide even coverage, avoiding areas of deep
a vehicle. The reaction time and the location of the
shadow between illuminated zones.
barrier also affect whether or not there will be
b. Gradually increase and decrease along vehic-
sufficient time to deploy a barrier in response to a
ular and pedestrian routes as traffic becomes more
threat. Access drives and parking areas may need
or less concentrated.
to be separated from facilities by sufficient dis-
c. Increase in areas of high concentration such
tance to mitigate the threat of vehicle bombs.
as intersections, parking, drop-offs, steps and
c. Site Features. In an area where there is an
building entrances.
identified threat, topography and vegetation
d. Avoid light spillage into neighboring sites.
should not be placed on the site perimeter where
e. Provide sufficient lighting to support visual
they will obstruct views of surrounding areas.
surveillance or closed circuit television as re-
Topography, vegetation, water and walls can be
quired.
used around a facility to slow movement towards
exposed building faces, to limit exposure of person-
4-10. Physical Security.
nel moving between buildings and parking areas,
a. General. Site design for physical security
and to block sightlines from vantage points. Pe-
should be developed to reduce vulnerabilities re-
rimeter walls may be used to mitigate blast effects
sulting from identified threats. A physical security
from an explosion but they must be carefully
located with respect to the protected facility. If the
engineer or specialist should address site design
wall is too far away from the facility, it may
issues including:
provide no benefit. If the wall is too close, it may
(1) Maintaining adequate distances from un-
compound the blast effects. Structural engineers
controlled areas.
will be consulted when considering the application
(2) Limiting accessibility to the site and facil-
of perimeter blast walls.
ities.
4-18